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Summary findings
Drawing on data from 265 national sample surveys  and Sub-Saharan Africa, and rose in Eastern Europe and
spanning 83 countries, Chen and Ravallion find that  Central Asia.
there was a net decrease in the total incidence of  The two main proximate causes of the disappointing
consumption poverty between 1987 and 1998. But it was  rate of poverty reduction: too little economic growth in
not enough to reduce the total number of poor people,  many of the poorest countries, and persistent inequalities
by various definitions.  (in both income and other essential measures) that kept
The incidence of poverty fell in Asia and the Middle  the poor from participating in the growth that did occur.
East and North Africa, changed little in Latin America
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Toulouse, France.1.  Introduction
This paper tries  to assess  progress  in reducing  consumption  poverty  in the
developing  and transition  economies  in 1987-98. We consider  various  definitions  of
what it means to be "poor". One  definition  says that someone  is poor if she lives in a
household  with a per capita  expenditure  (whether  in cash  or kind)  that is insufficient
when  judged by what "poverty"  typically  means in the world's poorest  countries.  This
definition  judges poverty  by standards  common  in South  Asia  and much of Sub-Saharan
Africa,  no matter where  one actually  lives.
We also consider  two  broader  definitions. In one, we count as poor all those  who
would  be judged so by standards  more  typical  of developing  countries  in East Asia
(except  China),  North Africa,  and poorer  countries  in Eastern  Europe  and Central  Asia.
In another  definition,  we say someone  is poor if she would  probably  be judged so if
living in the poorest countries,  or if she has an unusually  low  consumption  level relative
to others in the actual country  of residence.
While  we try to be eclectic  about  the definition  of consumption  poverty, we
recognize  that there are limitations  of all our definitions  - limitations  that we cannot  do
anything  about with the data available.  Potentially  important  examples  are the fact  that
our definition  of poverty  does  not directly  reflect inequality  within  the household,  and
that differences  in command  over non-market  goods are ignored.
Implementing  even  our somewhat  narrow  definitions  is nonetheless  difficult
given  the data available.  Our assumptions  in this paper  closely  follow  those of Chen  et
al., (1994)  and Ravallion  and Chen  (1997),  which  provide  more  complete  descriptions  of
the pros and cons of the methods  used. Here we focus on the differences  with our past
2methods, and present the main results of our up-date, drawing on new survey data and
new price data for exchange rate conversions.'  These estimates override all previous
estimates from this project, in that we have re-calculated everything back in time in the
light of the new data.
The next section describes country coverage of the data set we have constructed.
Section 3 describes the poverty line and exchange rates, while section 4 focuses on the
measures of poverty. Our main results for absolute poverty are discussed in section 5.
Section 6 tests their sensitivity to using instead a measure that takes account of relative
consumption when deciding who is poor.  Section 7 discusses the proximate causes or
our main findings, drawing on other literature. Section 8 concludes.
2.  Coverage of the data set
The first estimate under this project was for 1985 and was based on household
surveys for 22 countries, with an extrapolation model used for another 64 countries
(World Bank, 1990, Chapter 2; Ravallion et al., 1991). As more survey data became
available, the extrapolation model was dropped in favor of the assumption that the
average poverty rate for countries without distributional data equaled that for countries
with such data at the regional level; Chen et al., (1994) discuss this assumption further.
The first attempt to assess progress over time was Chen et al., (1994), which
provided estimates for 1985 and 1990 using data for 44 countries. The last up-date prior
to this paper used data from 122 surveys for 67 countries to make estimates for 1987,
1990 and 1993 (World Bank, 1996; Ravallion and Chen, 1997). The data set then
'  A web site is also in preparation  that will give further  details,  including  the individual  country
estimates.  The latest  year's estimates  at country  level are also published  in the World  Bank's
World Development Indicators (see,  for example,  World  Bank,  2000a).
3represented 85% of the population of the developing world (by which we mean Part 2
member countries of the World Bank).  The present up-date provides estimates for 1987,
1990, 1993, 1996 and 1998 using distributions from 265 national surveys from 83
countries representing 88% of the total population of the developing world.
As in the past estimates, all poverty and inequality measures are estimated from
the primary (unit record or tabulated) survey data. Unlike all other compilations of
distributional data that we know of, no secondary sources are used; we have not used any
pre-existing estimates from other compilations or country studies. The measures of
household living standards are normalized by household size. The distributions are
weighted by household size and sample expansion factors (when relevant) so that a given
fractile (such as the poorest decile) should have the same share of the country-specific
population across the sample. 2 The data come in various forms, ranging from micro data
to grouped tabulations; Chen et al. (1994) and Ravallion and Chen (1997) discuss our
estimation methods for grouped data.
As in past work, we have tried to eliminate any obvious comparability problems,
either by re-estimating the consumption/income aggregates or the more radical (though
thankfully not common) step of dropping a survey. However, there are comparability
problems that we cannot deal with; for example, it is known that differences in survey
method (such as in questionnaire design) and definitions can create non-negligible
differences in the estimates obtained for consumption or income.  Aggregation will
presumably reduce these problems but any regional differences will remain.
2  It is still surprisingly  common  to mix household  fractiles  and person fractiles  in data sets,  and
it is often unclear  which is which;  this matters  since household  size is negatively  correlated  with
consumption  per person,  and the size of this correlation  varies  from country  to country.
4Table 1 lists the surveys used, with their dates and welfare indicators, and
population coverage. Coverage varies greatly by region, ranging from 53% of the
population of the Middle East and North Africa to 98% of the population of South Asia.
Not all of the surveys available were included. We also had access to survey data
for Cambodia, Croatia, Djibouti, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Papua New Guinea and
Vietnam, but data were missing on either the purchasing power parity exchange rates of
consumer price indices. (These data are discussed further in the next section.) We also
had surveys for Tanzania (1993) and Ghana (1992 and 1997) but we chose not to use
them because of serious comparability problems that we could not resolve satisfactorily.
3.  Exchange  rates  and poverty  lines
Past estimates used the Penn World Tables (PWT) as the source of Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates for consumption (Ravallion et al., 1991; Chen et al.,
1994; Ravallion and Chen, 1997). However, in this version of the data set we have
switched to the consumption PPP estimates produced by the World Bank, both because of
their availability and for consistency with other World Bank data. The Bank's  1993 PPPs
are based on new price and consumption basket data collected by the 1993 International
Comparison Project (ICP) which covered 1  10 countries. PPPs from PWT 5.6 are based
on 1  980s ICP data and covered only 60 countries. The two sets of PPPs are not
comparable with each other even for the same year.
The international poverty line in our past work was set at $1 per day at 1985 PPP.
We re-assessed this poverty line to be consistent with the 1993 PPP's. The original
$ 1/day poverty line was chosen as being representative of the poverty lines found
amongst low-income countries (Ravallion et al., 1991). The same principle was applied
5in up-dating the poverty line with the new PPPs. The equivalent line in 1993 PPP is
about $1.08 a day in 1993 price ($32.74 per month); this is the median of the lowest ten
poverty lines within the same set of countries used by Ravallion et al. (1991). This is the
main poverty line we will focus on here, and we will simply call it the $1/day line. 3
We also re-ran the regression model for poverty lines reported in Ravallion et al.
(1991), using the new PPPs.  That paper regressed the log of the country-specific poverty
line on a quadratic function of consumption per capita, also at PPP; we can re-write that
specification in the equivalent form:
lnz,  a + /(c,  -Cmin)  + Y(C,  - Cmin) 2 +  gi  (i=1 ,..,n)  (1)
where  zi is the poverty line for country i with consumption per capita c, (with c. 2 c>
the lowest consumption per capita in the sample) in a sample of n countries while a,,6, y
are parameters we include a zero mean i.i.d. error term.  Notice that the intercept in (1)
gives the lower bound to the log poverty line, for the poorest country in the sample.
We estimated equation (1) on the Ravallion et al., (1991) data set of poverty lines
for 33 countries (though one was dropped because the 1993 PPP rate was not available).
Our estimate of a  was 3.46 (with a t-ratio of 40.5, based on the White standard error),
representing $1.05 per day ($31.96 per month), with a 95% confidence interval of ($0.88,
$1.24). (The regression coefficients on mean consumption and its squared value were
0.0040 and -1.56x10-6 with t-ratios of 6.54 and 2.81 respectively, and R2=0.88.) So our
$1.08 poverty line is a close approximation to the poverty line one would expect to find
in the poorest country. The fact that there is such close agreement between the estimated
3  The original  "$ per day" line was also rounded  off; it was actually  $31 per month  (Ravallion  et
al., 1991). Later this was changed  to $30.42  per month  (Chen  et al. (1994).
6intercept of equation (1) and the median poverty line amongst the poorest 10 countries in
this sample illustrates that the relationship is very flat amongst poor countries.
The poverty rate on this basis must thus be deemed a conservative estimate,
whereby aggregate poverty in the developing world is defined by perceptions'of poverty
found in the poorest countries. We also give results for twice this line (to give a poverty
line more typical of low-middle income countries), as well as a relative poverty line,
which varies with mean consumption in the country of residence. Naturally these give
higher estimates of the extent of poverty, though our main concern here is with how
much impact they have on our assessment of the extent of progress in reducing poverty.
4.  Measuring  absolute  consumption  poverty
In keeping with past work, we measure poverty in terms of household
consumption expenditure per capita. Of the 265 surveys, 181 allow us to estimate the
distribution of consumption expenditures; this is true of all the surveys used in the Middle
East and North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Table 1). For about one
quarter of the cases in which we do not have consumption distributions we do have
survey-based estimates of mean consumption, in which case we replace the income mean
by the consumption mean. (There is however no obvious basis for adjusting the Lorenz
curve; one expects higher inequality in an income distribution than a consumption
distribution for the same place and data.)  When only an income distribution is available,
we follow past practice of re-scaling mean income by one minus the national saving rate.4
4  We also re-estimated  the poverty  measures  without  this assumption;  our main findings on
trends over time and regional comparisons  are unaffected;  the main quantitative  effect is to
decrease  the poverty  rate in Latin America  (for which income  distributions  are more common
than other regions)  by a few percentage  points.  Details are available  from the authors.
7Having converted the international poverty line to local currency at PPP in 1993
we convert to the prices prevailing at each survey date using the country-specific official
Consumer Price Index (CPI). The weights in this index may or may not accord well with
consumer budget shares at the poverty line. In periods of relative price shifts, this will
bias our comparisons of the incidence of poverty over time, depending on the extent of
utility-compensated substitution possibilities for the people at the poverty line.
To estimate regional poverty at a given reference year (1996, say) we "line up"
the surveys in time using the same method described in Chen et al., (1994) and Ravallion
and Chen (1997). Within 83 countries in our data set, 17 have only one survey; 31 have
two surveys and 35 have three or more surveys over the period 1980 to 1998. If there is
only one survey for a country, then we estimate measures for each reference year by
applying the growth rate in real private consumption per person from the national
accounts to the survey mean - assuming in other words that the Lorenz curve for that
country does not change. 5 When the reference date (1993 say) is between two surveys
(1989 and 1995 say), we do the following. We first estimate the mean consumption at the
reference year using the NA growth rate between the survey year and the reference year.
Based on the example here, we have two means at the reference year based on two
surveys, M93(89) and M93(95) where M93(t) is the estimated mean for 1993 using the
survey for year t. Then we calculate the mean at the reference year M93 using a time
weighted average of M93(89) and M93(95). Next we estimate the poverty rate at the
reference year. Based on the 1989 distribution and M93, we get the H93(89). Similarly,
5  For  some countries  (Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyz,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Moldova,  Turkmenistan)  the  NA
consumption  data was incomplete. Then  we used instead  the GDP per capita  growth  rate.
8based on the 1995 distribution and M93, we get H93(95). Then the poverty headcount for
1993 is the simple average of H93(89) and H93(95).
We had not originally planned making an estimate for 1998, but we wanted to see
how much impact the East Asia crisis might have had. The estimate for 1998 is naturally
the weakest; we only have actual 1998 surveys for China, Russia, Thailand, Belarus,
Latvia, Yemen, and 1997 surveys for India, Jordan, Nigeria, Panama and Pakistan. For
other countries, the calculated poverty measures assume that the distribution is
unchanged, and adjust mean consumption by applying the private consumption growth
rate between the latest survey date and 1998. Given the weaker coverage, we call the
1998 estimate "preliminary" (though there is a sense in which this is true of the estimates
for all years, which, as in the past, we will up-date in the future as new data are obtained).
5.  Results
Table 2 gives our estimates of the headcount indices for $1.08 at 1993 PPP. Table
3 gives the results for twice this poverty line.
There are some notable differences with our previous estimates. Comparing the
most recent common year (1993), we estimate a slightly lower aggregate headcount index
(28.2% below $1 per day, versus 29.4% in Ravallion and Chen, 1997). But there are
some notable differences in the regional composition of poverty. The estimated poverty
rate for 1993 has risen sharply in Sub-Saharan Africa (49.7%, versus 39.1% in Ravallion
and Chen), but fallen sharply in Latin America (15.3% versus 23.5%) and the Middle
East and North Africa (1.9% versus 4.1%), with small declines in South Asia (42.4%
versus 43.1%) and East Asia (25.2% versus 26.0%), and a small increase in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia (4.0% versus 3.5%). While there have been many changes in
9the survey data available, these changes in the estimated regional composition of
aggregate poverty are largely due to the changes in PPP exchange rates.
The new estimates suggest that the aggregate poverty rate has fallen over the
period, from 28.3% of the 1987 population living in households with consumption per
capita below $1 per day to 24.0% in 1998. Over the longest comparable period (1987-
1993) our new results suggest less progress in reducing poverty. (In Ravallion and Chen,
1997, we found that the aggregate poverty rate fell by 4% from 30.7% in 1987 to 29.4%
in 1993; over the same period, we find less than a 1% decline.) This reflects the higher
share of poverty attributed to Sub-Saharan  Africa, where (by both sets of estimates) the
poverty rate increased over the period 1987-93.
In common with past estimates, we find however that the decrease in the average
poverty rate was not sufficient to reduce the aggregate number of poor, with 1.2-1.3
billion people living below $1 per day line. If we exclude China, the total number of
poor has risen steadily over the period (Table 2).
We find that the trend reduction in poverty in East Asia reversed at the time of the
crisis. The aggregate change is small -a  0.4 percentage point increase in the proportion
of the population living under $1 per day in the region.  However (in common with most
other assessments of the welfare impact of such crises), this "before-after" comparison
does not take account of what the poverty rate in the region would have been without the
crisis.  The counter-factual increase is clearly larger, given the progress prior to 1998.
To assess the counter-factual we forecast forward from the data prior to the crisis.
In particular, we fit a least squares line through the data for East Asia prior to the crisis,
and use this to predict what the incidence of poverty would have been in 1998 without the
10crisis. This assumes that the pre-crisis pace of poverty reduction would have been
sustainable without the crisis. We ignore any impacts on China's poor; the welfare impact
of the crisis on China was thought to be small at the time, and this is consistent with the
fact that 76% of the increase in the number of people living under $1 per day in the
region was outside China (Table 2).  Fitting a linear trend to the $1 per day poverty rates
for 1987-96 for East Asia (excluding China) one obtains an estimate of 7.42% for the
headcount index in 1998 (with a standard error of 1.06).6 Comparing this to the estimate
for 1998 in Table 2 suggests that the crisis increased the incidence of poverty in the
region (excluding China) by four percentage points, representing 22 million people-
more than twice the impact suggested by the "before-after" comparison. The aggregate
number of poor (over all regions) rose by eight million (Table 2).  So this assessment of
the counter-factual suggests that we would have seen a continuing decrease in the number
of poor in the developing world after 1993 if not for the East Asia crisis.
Performing the same calculation for the $2 poverty line, the projected poverty rate
for 1998 is 39.34% (standard error of 1.36), as compared to the figure of 44.96% in Table
3. Thus the number of people living under $2 per day would have fallen by an extra 33
million without the East Asia crisis. Unlike the $1 line, this would not have been
sufficient to achieve a reduction in the aggregate number of poor in 1998, which rose by
more than 33 million when compared to 1996 (Table 3).
These calculations must be treated with some caution.  For example, it should be
recalled that for many countries the 1998 estimate is a distribution-neutral extrapolation;
if distribution improved (worsened) in the crisis, these calculations will over- (under-)
6  The regression  line is 7.42-1.49(year-1998)  with t-ratios  of 7.01  and -10.26 (significant  at the
2% and 1% levels respectively);  the R-squared  is 0.98.
11estimate  its impact  relative to the counter-factual.  There is no obvious  basis for a
judgement  of the likely bias, from  the evidence  available. 7 Nor can we be sure that the
pre-crisis  rate of growth would  have  continued  if there had been  no crisis  (though  the
high growth  rates  were not widely  thought  to be unsustainable  at the time).
Turning  to other regions,  we find  a trend increase  in poverty  in Eastern  Europe
and Central  Asia. The number  of people  in this region estimated  to live below  the $1 per
day line increased  from I million  to 24 million  over this period. Over  the whole  period,
the poverty  rate has changed  little in Latin  America  and  the Caribbean,  though  there are
signs  of a small net gain to the poor  in the 1990s.  There is a marked  fall in the incidence
of poverty  in the Middle  East  and North  Africa,  though  most of this was in the late 1980s.
There is a trend decrease  in the poverty  rate in South  Asia, with a five  percentage-  point
drop in the percentage  of the population  living under  $1 per day. This  was not enough to
prevent  rising  total number  of poor  in this region.  There  was no net reduction  in the
poverty  rate of Sub-Saharan  Africa  over the period.
Throughout  the period,  the region with the highest  poverty  incidence  relative  to
the $1 per day line is Sub-Saharan  Africa,  followed  closely  by South  Asia, though the
ranking  reverses  if one uses  the "$2" poverty  line in Table  3. Together  these  two regions
accounted  for 68% of those living  below  $1 per day in 1998,  up from 58% in 1987;  six
percentage  points of this increase  was in Sub-Saharan  Africa,  which  accounted  for 24%
of the poor in 1998  by this measure,  up from 18%  in 1987.
East  Asia came  third in terms  of the incidence  of poverty  initially,  but its rapid
reduction  in poverty (up to the crisis)  meant  that Latin  America  overtook  it in the mid-
7  World  Bank  (2000b)  present  evidence  of  a decrease  in inequality  in Indonesia  during  the 1998
crisis,  but  there  was  a small  increase  in  (urban)  inequality  in  Korea  and  Thailand.
121990s. Eastern Europe and Central Asia started the period as the region with the lowest
poverty incidence, but by the end of the period it had overtaken Middle-East and North
Africa, though this is not robust to the choice of poverty line (comparing Tables 2 and 3).
Comparing Tables 2 and 3 we see sizable differences in how much doubling the
poverty line adds to the headcount index. This has bearing on the poverty impact of
consumption growth.  From Tables 2 and 3 we can calculate the percentage reduction in
the $2 per day headcount index from a doubling of mean consumption holding the Lorenz
curve constant.8 The aggregate impact is a 57% reduction. The lowest impact is in Sub-
Saharan Africa for which the $2 poverty rate falls by 39%, and the highest is Middle East
and North Africa, where it falls by 91%.  Between these extremes, a doubling of mean
consumption reduces the $2 poverty rate by 69% in East Asia, 74% in Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, 57% in Latin America, and 52% in South Asia.
Table 4 gives the poverty gap indices; these follow a similar pattern to the
headcount indices. 9 The regional rankings are identical to the headcount index, but there
are some differences in magnitudes. The most notable is the proportionately larger
difference in the poverty gap index between Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia;
although the headcount index is only slightly higher in Africa, the poverty gap index for
the $1 per day line is far higher.
Thus there is greater depth of poverty in Africa, suggesting that (unless inequality
falls) it will take more growth to have the same proportionate impact on Sub-Saharan
Africa's poverty gap as South Asia's, similarly to what we found for the headcount index.
s  This calculation  uses  the fact that  the headcount  index  is homogeneous  of degree zero between
the mean and the poverty  line, holding  the Lorenz  curve  constant.
9 The poverty  gap index  is mean  distance  below  the poverty  line  where the mean is taken  over
the whole population,  counting  the non-poor  as having  zero poverty  gap.
13This is borne out by the Kakwani  (1993)  elasticities  of the poverty  gap index to
distribution-neutral  growth,  which  are -1.31 for Sub-Saharan  Africa  versus -3.21 in
South Asia (for the $1 per day line  in 1998).lo  The corresponding  elasticities  for other
regions  are -2.67 for East  Asia (-3.45 excluding China),  -2.29 for Eastern Europe  and
Central  Asia, -1.93 for Latin  America,  -9.26 for the Middle  East and  North Africa
(though  this is deceptive,  given  that proportionately  fewer  people  live below the $1 per
day line in this region; using  the $2 line the elasticity  falls sharply,  to -1.35). The overall
elasticity  for the developing  world is -2.33. This has changed  little over time (the value
for 1987  is -2.28), and it has also proved  quite resistant  to changes  in the data and
assumptions  (the first estimate  for 1985  was -2.2; see Ravallion  et al., 1991).
Poverty-gap  comparisons  over time are also similar  to the headcount  index. One
noticeable  difference  is how much  faster  this index of poverty  has fallen  in South Asia
than the headcount  index; over  the period 1987-98  we find a 27% drop in South Asia's
poverty  gap index for the $1 per day line, versus 11%  for the headcount  index.
6.  Allowing for low relative consumption
So far we have aimed to treat the same consumption level (at PPP) the same way
no matter what country a person  lives in. It has been argued  that this does not capture
relative deprivation,  such that a poor person  needs higher  consumption  when living in a
rich country, so as to participate  fully  in that society.
While one might accept  this point in principle,  it is far from clear how exactly  one
should  implement  it empirically. A common  practice in measuring  poverty in OECD
'°  The elasticity  of the poverty  gap index  (PG) to growth  in the mean  holding  the Lorenz curve
constant  is 1-H/PG, where  H is the  headcount  index  (Kakwani,  1993).
14countries  is to use a poverty  line that is half of mean  income in each country (Atkinson,
1998 and Smeeding,  1997). However,  this would  entail  counting  people as not being
poor in poor countries  even though they fall below  prevailing  poverty  lines in those
countries.  One could instead  draw on the poverty  measures  that are actually  used in the
countries  concerned.  (World  Bank,  2000a, provides  a compilation  from the World Bank's
own poverty  assessments.)  However,  this raises  further  concerns  about comparability  in
the country-specific  welfare  indicators  used;  some  countries  prefer income,  some
consumption,  for example.  And the measures  do not line  up in time. Yet another  option is
to use the poverty  lines actually  found in country  studies,  but apply them to our
distributional  data. However,  there are clearly  idiosyncratic  factors  in these poverty  lines;
they are often geared  to specific  features  of the welfare indicator  used, and they are not
immune  from local political  manipulation.  A more  attractive  option might be to adjust  the
poverty line according  to equation  (1).I! However,  while  this equation  makes sense as a
basis for estimating  the expected  poverty line in the poorest  country,  it is not the most
obvious way one can think about setting  relative  poverty  lines.  12
Atkinson  and  Bourguignon  (1999)  propose an alternative  approach  in which the
poverty line is $  1/day  in the poorest  country  but does  not rise with average  consumption
until it reaches  a critical value,  after  which it rises proportionately  to consumption.  They
derive this specification  by assuming  that a person  is deemed  poor if she does not attain
"  In comments  on Ravallion  et al., (1991),  the late Bela Balassa  suggested  that equation  (1)
should be used for this purpose.  The suggestion  was never  pursued,  on the grounds  that the focus
should remain  absolute  poverty  in terms  of consumption.  Of course, if instead  one defines
absolute poverty  in the space of utility  and assumes  that utility  depends on both own consumption
and relative  consumption  then it is easy to see that the consumption  poverty line will rise with
mean consumption  (Ravallion,  1998). A similar  argument  can be made in the space of
capabilities,  following  Sen (1985).
15either  the $1 per day consumption  level (loosely  interpretable  as physical needs),  or a
given proportion  of mean consumption  ("social  needs").
In principle  one can also generate  a smooth  convex  curve such as in equation  (1)
by allowing  for a list of social  needs,  each proportional  to consumption,  but at different
rates.  Then the Atkinson-Bourguignon  specification  will be smoothed  out, depending  on
how many of these needs  there are. With this extension  to their  model one can also
rationalize  the type of smooth  convex  model  in Ravallion  et al (1991) and Ravallion
(1998). However,  the Atkinson-Bourguignon  proposal  offers  a more intuitive and
parsimonious  representation  of the relationship  than  equation  (1), and fits the data  quite
well, with a sum of squared  residuals  only slightly  higher  than  the specification  in
equation  (1).
We chose  a slightly  modified  version of the Atkinson-Bourguignon  specification
in measuring  relative  poverty  in this section.  In particular,  we assume  that to be deemed
"not poor" a person must meet  both the "$1 per day" absolute  consumption  standard  and
consume  more than some  proportion  of the mean consumption  in the country  of
residence. We set the constant  of proportionality  to avoid  social  exclusion  at one  third;
this gave  the best fit to the data  used in setting  the $1.08  poverty  line." 3 The poverty  line
in $'s per day at 1993  PPP for any country  is then given  by max($1.08,  c, /3) where  c is
mean consumption  per capita in 1993  at 1993 Ppp.14
12  The  elasticity  of the  poverty  line  to mean  consumption  is unbounded  above  using  equation  (1).
However,  unity  would  seem  a plausible  upper  bound.
13  By eye-balling  the data,  Atkinson  and  Bourguignon  chose  a slope  of 0.37,  based  on the
Ravallion  et al.,  (1991)  data.  On  the  new  1993  PPP  rates,  a slope  of one  in three  fits  the data
slightly  better  in terms  of the sum  of squared  errors  (based  on  a line  search  at 0.01  intervals
between  0.30  and  0.50).
14  Countries  in a neighborhood  of  the  kink  (+/-  15%  of $3.23  consumption  per  day  in 1993)
include  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Gambia,  Ghana,  Moldova,  Pakistan,  Senegal,  and  Zimbabwe.
16However, we do not change the real value of the poverty line over time in any
given country. If we did, then for those countries with mean consumption above $3.24
per day, the poverty measures would then be independent of absolute levels of
consumption (an depend solely on the percentile of the population for which the Lorenz
curve as a slope of 1/3). Furthernore, while less poor countries tend to have higher
poverty lines, it appears to be rare to observe changes (in either direction) in the real
value of the poverty line in developing countries with changes in average consumption
over the length of time we are considering here.
Table 5 gives the results. As one would expect the poverty rate rises sharply in
East Asia (outside China), Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, and the
Middle East and North Africa. The overall headcount of the poor rises to 1.6 billion.
Trends over time are little affected.
The greatest proportionate impacts on the headcount index of allowing for low
relative consumption are for the Middle East/North Africa and Eastern Europe/Central
Asia. However, the impact on Latin America and the Caribbean is probably more nc-table
because this region now emerges as the one with the highest incidence of poverty, with
slightly over half the region's population live in poverty by this definition. The mean
poverty line for Latin America is three times the $1.08 line (Table 5).5 With this
magnitude of upward adjustment to the poverty line it is not surprising that this region
overtakes South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Of course, as one can already guess from
Table 3, much more than half of the populations of South Asia and Africa live below
Latin America's mean poverty line.
'5  We present  the (population-weighted)  mean  poverty  lines in Table 5 for expository  purposes
only;  country-specific  poverty  lines were used  for the calculations.
177.  Why was there not more progress against poverty?
In the aggregate,  and for some large  regions,  all our measures  suggest  that  the
1990s  did not see much progress  against  consumption  poverty  in the developing  world.
Yet this was a period  of aggregate  economic  growth;  the overall  rate of growth  in real per
capita private  consumption  for the low- and middle-income  countries  over 1990-97  was
2.6% per year  (World  Bank, 2000a).  The elasticity  of the aggregate  ($1/day)  poverty  gap
in 1987 was -2.3. Even assuming  no growth  from 1987  to 1990, an annual  rate of growth
in mean consumption  of 2.6% over 1990-97  alone  would  have  virtually  halved  the
aggregate  poverty  gap, as long as overall inequality  did not worsen.
What  went wrong?  Rising  inequality  was one  factor.  As the first paper  from this
project showed  (Ravallion,  et al., 1991),  the world distribution  of consumption  in 1985
was such that it would  not take much of an increase  in overall  inequality  to wipe out  the
benefits  to the world's poor of modest  growth  in consumption  per capita. The simulations
in Ravallion  et al. (1991)  indicated  that about a four  percent  increase  in the world's Gini
index, spread  over 15 years  from 1985,  would  be sufficient  to wipe out the gains  to the
poor from a sustained  one percent  per annum  rate  of growth  in consumption  per capita. 16
There is now  evidence  of quite sharply  rising  inter-personal  income inequality  in the
world during  this period; Milanovic  (1999)  estimates  that the world Gini index  increased
by 5% between 1988  and 1993  (from  0.63 to 0.66). This could  easily wipe out the gains
to the world's poor  from global  economic  growth.
16  The  simulations  assumed  that  the world  Lorenz  curve  shifts  out  by  an equal  proportion  at all
points  (following  the  assumption  made  by Kakwani,  1993).
18Why was world inequality rising? Very few individual countries have
experienced a trend increase in inequality over the longer term (a few decades, say)
(Bruno et al., 1998).  17 Over shorter periods (one to five years) one finds rising inequality
in about half the developing countries, though this is uncorrelated with growth rates in
average household consumption per capita (Ravallion and Chen, 1997).
The more important factor in rising global inequality has been rising inequality
between countries. This accounts for three-quarters of the increase in the world Gini
index from 1988 to 1993 (Milanovic, 1999). The unconditional growth divergence we
have seen in the 1980s and 1990s  - whereby growth rates have tended to be lower in
poorer countries (Pritchett, 1997)  - appears to be a far more important reason for the
low rate of aggregate poverty reduction than rising inequality within poor economies.
Nonetheless, even when it is not rising, inequality within countries is an important
constraint on prospects for pro-poor growth. There is evidence that the same rate of
growth can have very different impacts on absolute consumption poverty (Ravallion,
1997). Differences in the growth elasticities of absolute poverty appear to arise in large
part from initial inequalities in incomes, education attainments and other dimensions
(including geographic differences within countries). Indeed, there is evidence that initial
inequality is too high in some countries to assure poverty-reducing growth even when the
fundamentals are conducive to growth (Ravallion, 1997)."8
While Sub-Saiharan  Africa is certainly not the only place where inequality
impedes pro-poor growth, the depth of poverty (even relative to its high incidence) in that
"7 China  is one of the few cases of steadily  rising inequality  since  the mid-  1980s,  though  given
its population  weight,  this is an important  exception.
's  On the role of inequalities  in both non-income  dimensions  in inhibiting  pro-poor  growth  see
Ravallion  and Datt  (1999) (using data for India).
19region carries a warning for the future. Africa will probably need a higher growth rate
than South Asia (where the incidence of poverty is currently only slightly lower than
Africa) to achieve the same rate of poverty reduction in the coming years. Yet private
consumption per capita contracted in Sub-Saharan Africa over 1990-97 (at -1.2% per
year, versus 2.6% growth for low and middle income countries as a whole; World Bank,
2000a).
8.  Conclusions
We have provided new estimates of the extent and depth of absolute consumption
poverty in the developing world, and the incidence of relative consumption poverty, over
1987-98. In measuring absolute consumption poverty we have followed past practice in
using an international poverty line that accords with an idea of "poverty" typical of the
poorest countries. This gives a poverty line of about $1 per day, though we have also
considered a line arbitrarily set at twice this value. In estimating the incidence of relative
consumption poverty, we also count as poor people who consumed more than $1 per day
but less than one third of mean consumption in their country of residence. We have
drawn on new household survey and price data, and all past estimates from this project
have been revised in the light of the new data.
We find that the percentage of the population of the developing world living
below $1 per day in 1998 was 24%, about four points lower than 1987. Factoring in our
allowance for low relative consumption brings the incidence of poverty in 1998 up to
32%, also four percentage points lower than in 1987. The total number of poor was about
the same at the end of this period as the beginning. Roughly 1.2 billion people lived
below $1 per day, while a further 0.4 billion consumed more than this amount, but less
20than one third of the mean in their country of residence.  Between 1993 and 1998 we did
see a fall in the number of poor, by about 100 million; this is largely accountable to a
sharp decline in the number of people consuming less than $1 per day in China.
Without the East Asia crisis, a continuation of the trend decline in poverty in East
Asia would have meant a slightly lower number of people living below $1 per day in the
1998 than 1987. However, even factoring out the effect of the crisis, the number living
below $2 per day rose over the period.
These aggregates hide diverse experiences over time and across regions. Only two
regions saw falling numbers of consumption poor, namely East Asia (though with a
reversal due to the crisis) and the Middle East and North Africa. The proportion of people
living below $1 per day fell steadily in South Asia, but not enough to prevent rising
numbers of poor. The proportion fell in Sub-Saharan Africa after 1993, though again not
enough to prevent rising numbers of poor. The poverty rate fluctuated with no clear trend
in Latin America. And it rose dramatically in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, though
from a low base by the standards of what poverty means in poor developing countries.
Drawing on other literature, we have suggested two proximate causes of the low
overall rate of poverty reduction in the 1990s, despite aggregate economic growth in the
developing world.  Firstly, too little of that economic growth was in the poorest countries.
Secondly, persistent inequalities (in both income and non-income dimensions) within
those countries and elsewhere prevented the poor from participating fully in the growth
that did occur.
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23Table 1. Coverage  of the Data  Set
Region  % of 1998  Country  Survey  dates  Welfare indicator
population
represented
East  Asia  90.8  China  1985, 1990, 1992-  Income
1998
Indonesia  1984, 1987,  1990, 1993,  1996  Expenditure
Korea  1988, 1993  Income
Laos  1992  Expenditure
Malaysia  1984,  1987, 1992,  1995  Income
Mongolia  1995  Expenditure
Philippines  1985, 1988, 1991,  1994,  1997  Expenditure
Thailand  1981, 1988  Income
1988, 1992, 1996,  1998  Expenditure
Eastern  Europe  81.7  Albania  1997  Expenditure
& Central  Asia  Belarus  1988,  1993, 1995,  1998  Income
Bulgaria  1989,  1992, 1994,  1995  Expenditure
Czech  Republic  1988, 1993  Income
Estonia  1988, 1993, 1995  Income
Hungary  1989, 1993  Income
Kazakhstan  1988, 1993  Income
1993, 1996  Expenditure
Kyrgyz  Republic  1988, 1993  Income
1993, 1997  Expenditure
Latvia  1988, 1993,  1995,  1998  Income
Lithuania  1988, 1993,  1994,  1996  Income
Moldova  1988, 1992  Income
Poland  1985, 1987,  1989,  1993  Income
1990, 1992,  1993-96  Expenditure
Romania  1989, 1992,  1994  Income
Russian  Federation  1988, 1993  Income
1993, 1996,  1998  Expenditure
Slovak  Republic  1988, 1992  Income
Slovenia  1987, 1993  Income
Turkey  1987, 1994  Expenditure
Turkmenistan  1988, 1993  Income
Ukraine  1988, 1992  Income
1995, 1996  Expenditure
Uzbekistan  1988, 1993  Income
Latin America  88.0  Bolivia  1990  Income
& Caribbean  Brazil  1985, 1988-89,  1993,  1995-96  Income
Chile  1987, 1990, 1992,  1994  Income
Colombia  1988,  1991, 1995-96  Income
Costa Rica  1986, 1990,  1993,  1996  Income
Dominican  Republic 1989, 1996  Income
24Ecuador  1988,  1994-95  Expenditure
El Salvador  1989,  1995-96  Income
Guatemala  1987,  1989  Income
Guyana  1993  Expenditure
Honduras  1989-90,  1992,  1994, 1996  Income
Jamaica  1988-90,  1993,1996  Expenditure
Mexico  1984,  1992  Expenditure
1989,  1995  Income
Nicaragua  1993  Expenditure
Panama  1989,  1991,  1995-97  Income
Paraguay  1990,  1995  Income
Peru  1985,  1994,  1996  Expenditure
1994, 1996  Income
St. Lucia  1995  Income
Trinidad  and Tobago 1988,  1992  Income
Uruguay  1989  Income
Venezuela  1981,  1987,  1989,  1993,  1995-  Income
96
Middle  East &  52.5  Algeria  1988,  1995  Expenditure
North Africa  Egypt,  Arab Rep.  1991,  1995  Expenditure
Jordan  1987,  1992,  1997  Expenditure
Morocco  1985, 1990  Expenditure
Tunisia  1985,  1990  Expenditure
Yemen  1992, 1998  Expenditure
South  Asia  98.0  Bangladesh  1984-85,  1988,  1992, 1996  Expenditure
India  1983,  1986-90,  1992, 1994-97  Expenditure
Nepal  1985,  1995  Expenditure
Pakistan  1986/87,  1990/91,  1992/93,  Expenditure
1996/97
Sri Lanka  1985,  1990,  1995  Expenditure
Sub-Saharan  72.9  Botswana  1985/86  Expenditure
Africa  Burkina  Faso  1994  Expenditure
Central  African  Rep. 1993  Expenditure
Cote  d'Ivoire  1985-88,  1993,  1995  Expenditure
Ethiopia  1981, 1995  Expenditure
Gambia  1992  Expenditure
Ghana  1987,  1989  Expenditure
Kenya  1992,  1994  Expenditure
Lesotho  1986,  1993  Expenditure
Madagascar  1980,  1993,  1997  Expenditure
Mali  1989,  1994  Expenditure
Mauritania  1988, 1993,  1995  Expenditure
Mozambique  1996/97  Expenditure
Niger  1992,  1995  Expenditure
Nigeria  1985,  1992,  1997  Expenditure
Rwanda  1983/85  Expenditure
25Senegal  1991, 1994  Expenditure
Sierra  Leone  1989  Expenditure
South  Africa  1993  Expenditure
Tanzania  1991  Expenditure
Uganda  1988,  1992  Expenditure
Zambia  1991, 1993,  1996  Expenditure
Zimbabwe  1990/91  Expenditure
Note:  Since  making  this list  new  surveys  have  become  available  for  Croatia  (1998),  Czech  Republic
(1996),  Indonesia  (1999),  Malaysia  (1997),  Poland  (1996),  Turkmenistan  (1998),  Morocco  (1  998/99)
and Madagascar  (1997).  While  these  did not arrive  in time,  they  will  be included  in future  up-dates.
26Table  2. Population  living below  $1.08 per day at 1993  PPP
Region  Headcount  index  (% living in  Number of poor (millions)
households  that consume  less
than  the poverty  line)
1987  1990  1993  1996  1998  1987  1990  1993  1996  1998
(prelim.)  (prelim.)
EastAsia  26.60  27.58  25.24  14.93  15.32  417.53  452.45  431.91  265.13  278.32
(excludingChina)  23.94  18.51  15.87  9.97  11.26  114.14  91.98  83.52  55.08  65.15
Eastern  Europe  &  0.24  1.56  3.95  5.12  5.14  1.07  7.14  18.26  23.82  23.98
Central  Asia
Latin  America  15.33  16.80  15.31  15.63  15.57  63.66  73.76  70.79  75.99  78.16
& Caribbean
Middle  East  &  4.30  2.39  1.93  1.83  1.95  9.31  5.66  4.95  5.01  5.55
North Africa
South  Asia  44.94  44.01  42.39  42.26  39.99  474.41  495.11  505.08  531.65  522.00
Sub-Saharan  46.61  47.67  49.68  48.53  46.30  217.22  242.31  273.29  288.97  290.87
Africa
Total  28.31  28.95  28.15  24.53  23.96  1183.19  1276.41  1304.29  1190.58  1198.88
(excluding  China)  28.51  28.05  27.72  27.01  26.18  879.81  915.94  955.89  980.53  985.71Table 3. Population living below $2.15 per day at 1993 PPP
Region  Headcount  Index (%)  Number  of poor  (millions)
1987  1990  1993  1996  1998  1987  1990  1993  1996  1998
(prelim.)  (prelim.)
East Asia  67.04  66.11  60.52  48.63  49.10  1052.32  1084.44  1035.85  863.86  892.23
(excluding  China)  62.90  57.33  51.61  42.78  44.96  299.92  284.92  271.62  236.30  260.11
Eastem  Europe  &  3.59  9.55  17.17  19.91  19.92  16.35  43.83  79.38  92.67  92.87
Central  Asia
Latin America  35.54  38.09  35.07  37.00  36.44  147.56  167.21  162.20  179.82  182.86
& Caribbean
Middle  East &  30.03  24.76  24.12  22.16  21.88  65.09  58.70  61.75  60.58  62.37
North Africa
South  Asia  86.30  86.76  85.41  85.02  83.96  911.04  975.95  1017.83  1069.48  1095.89
Sub-Saharan  76.52  76.37  77.76  76.87  75.57  356.64  388.24  427.76  457.67  474.81
Africa
Total  61.00  61.66  60.10  56.12  55.98  2549.01  2718.37  2784.77  2724.09  2801.03
(excluding  China)  58.22  58.77  58.59  57.75  57.60  1796.61  1918.84  2020.54  2096.53  2168.91
28Table 4. Poverty gap indices
Region  Poverty  gap index  (%) ($1.08)  Poverty gap index  (%) ($2.15)
1987  1990  1993  1996  1998  1987  1990  1993  1996  1998
(prelim.)  (prelim.)
East Asia  6.82  7.64  7.48  4.00  4.17  28.61  28.85  26.25  18.23  18.62
(excluding  China)  5.64  4.11  3.59  2.27  2.53  25.92  22.14  19.37  14.45  15.63
Eastern  Europe  &  0.05  0.99  1.29  1.54  1.56  0.88  2.38  5.58  6.37  6.32
Central  Asia
Latin America  5.22  5.95  5.81  5.28  5.32  15.54  17.10  15.37  16.06  15.79
& Caribbean
Middle  East &  1.01  0.46  0.35  0.38  0.19  12.78  10.65  10.16  9.56  9.32
North Africa
South  Asia  12.97  12.00  11.17  10.55  9.50  41.90  41.42  40.27  39.90  38.88
Sub-Saharan  19.96  20.36  21.67  21.47  20.07  42.11  42.53  44.02  43.36  41.76
Africa
Total  8.64  8.97  8.93  7.53  7.20  28.33  28.73  27.93  25.08  24.85
(excluding  China)  9.10  8.90  8.84  8.46  7.95  27.82  27.67  27.45  26.82  26.44
29Table  5. Relative  poverty
Region  Mean  Headcount  index  Number  of poor (millions)
poverty  1987  1990  1993  1996  1998  1987  1990  1993  1996  1998
line  ($/day,  (prelim.)  (prelim.)
1993  PPP)
East  Asia  1.29  33.01  33.69  29.82  19.03  19.56  518.25  552.68  510.29  338.00  355.45
(excluding  China)  1.92  45.06  38.68  30.76  23.16  24.55  214.86  192.21  161.89  127.95  142.03
Eastern  Europe  &  2.71  7.54  16.19  25.34  26.08  25.60  34.35  74.29  117.12  121.39  119.34
Central  Asia
Latin America  3.31  50.20  51.48  51.08  51.95  51.35  208.43  225.97  236.24  252.50  257.71
& Caribbean
Middle  East&  1.78  18.93  14.49  13.62  11.40  10.76  41.03  34.35  34.86  31.16  30.69
North  Africa
South  Asia  1.08  45.20  44.21  42.52  42.49  40.20  477.21  497.28  506.64  534.53  524.75
Sub-Saharan  1.33  51.09  52.05  54.01  52.80  50.49  238.10  264.60  297.09  314.39  317.20
Africa
Total  1.59  36.31  37.41  36.73  32.79  32.08  1517.37  1649.17  1702.24  1591.97  1605.13
(excluding  China)  1.79  39.34  39.47  39.26  38.06  36.96  1213.98  1288.70  1353.84  1381.92  1391.71
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